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EU\VARD HAROLD SCHAD, JR., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
11588 
OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the judgment of conviction 
of rnnrder in the second degree and from the trial court's 
denial of the motion for a new trial. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
'rhe appellant was charged by information with the 
crilnP of murdn in the first degree and was tried by 
a jnry which returned a verdict of guilty of murder in 
tlw SP<·ornl dt>gree. Appellant's motion for a new trial 
\\a;.; dPnied. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the jud1:,'11lent of convic-
tion, or alternatively, to have the trial court's denial of 
appellant's motion for a new trial reyersed and the case 
remanded for a new trial. 
OF FACTS 
At 7 :30 p.m. on July 5, 1968, Lynda Olson dis-
covered the nude body of her hrotht>r, Clare Odell 
Mortensen, in a clos('t in his aparh1wnt on the lower 
Avenues in Salt Lake City (T 112). The decedent's 
hands were bound behind his back with leather thong1' 
and small-diameter nylon cords which were tied rather 
loosely and v,dth simple overhand knots (T 118, 419). 
The ankles were also bound ( T 155), and two pieces of 
cloth had been tied around the face and neck (T 157, 403). 
At the time the body was found the front door of the 
apartment was locked (T 148), but the back door was 
ajar (T 105). 
A post-mortem examination disclosed that the de-
cedent had engaged in both active and passive anal 
sodomy (T 405, 417), as well as fellatio (T 416) near 
the time of death. Bruises and scratches were fonnd 
on the knees and legs of the deceasPd and tlwre were 
superficial abrasions on the iwni:-; and scrotmn (T 405). 
Dr. JamPs T. "\Veston, thP medical examinc>r who per-
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formed the autopsy, testified that the cause of death 
\ms rl·strirtrd venous return of blood from the brain 
eaused hy the ligature placed about the decedent's neck 
( T 408). Dr. Weston testified, however, that the ligature 
was not tight enough to impair the supply of blood to 
the brain (T 4:31 ). From this, Dr. Weston concluded that 
the purpose of the ligatures had been to heighten erotic 
stimulus during an act of sodomy immediately prior to 
death ( T 493, 655), and that the death had been acci-
<kntal (T 494). The time of death \rns fixed beitween 
noon and 10:00 p.rn. Jul.'· 4, 1968 (T 409). 
It was shown at trial that the decl"<ient had for a 
long pt·riod of time engaged in acts of anal sodomy 
( 11 +05). In addition, he had suffered from paralysis 
( '11 1fi2), which was attributed to a tumor found in the 
dee<'dent's hrain (T 439). rrhere was testimony that the 
<l"('P<l<:·nt had PxperiPnced frequent diz11y spells (T 172) 
and liad constantly used a variPty of prescription drugs 
for his varions physical ailments (T 96, 172). Dr. Weston 
that the drugs and the tmnor could have con-
trilmted to canse of death (T 435, 442). 
Appt-llant had been seen in the company of decedent 
at 11 ::30 p.rn. on July 3 ( T 89). A neighbor testified 
that slir ha<l talked with appellant outside the decedent's 
honw at 9:15 p.m. on July 4 (T 184), but had not seen 
app<:•llant enter or leave thE> decedent's residence at that 
filll(' (T 22G). Another neighbor testified that he had 
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seen appellant r<>placing a windff\\' screen at the deced-
ent's apartment at 8 :15 a.m. on July 5 (T 209). Appellant 
testified that he had left Ft. Lewis, vVashington on July 
1, 1968, and arrived in Salt Lake City at 4 :45 a.m. on 
July 3 (T 470, 472). Upon his arrival he went to a cafe, 
where he met the decedent (T 474), who invited appel-
lant to stay at his apartment (T 475 ). Appellant ac-
cepted, and followed decedent to the apartment at 6 :00 
a.m.. on July 3 (T 477). Thereafter, he accompanied 
decedent to a local tavern, a friend's housP, and another 
tavern, returning to the apartment at :00 p.m. ('r 518, 
519). At about 4:45 p.rn., the two a.gain left the avart-
ment and visited two taverns (T 520, 5:22). Decedent 
left appellant alone at midnight (T 522) and appellant 
accompanied three other persons on a trip to the Great 
Salt Lake (T 289, 5254). Returning at 6 :00 a.rn. on 
July 4, appellant went again to decedent's apartment (T 
525, 526). After drinking coffee appellant and the de-
cedent went again to a tavern (T 527) where appellant 
testified that the decedent carried on an intimate con-
versation with a heavy-set man (T 530). The two invited 
appellant to attend a rodeo with them, but appellant 
declined (T 531). The decedent then took appellant to 
another tavern and left him then• at 12 :30 p.m., after 
which appellant testified he never again saw the decedent 
(T 531). 
Appellant left the tavern at 9 :00 p.m. on July 4, 
and walked to the decedent's apartment (T 533), where 
he talked with the neighbor and picked up his belongings 
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from thP hack porch of the decedent's apartment (T 536). 
He <l<'nied returning to the apartment and replacing a 
window sneen on the morning of July 5 ( T 621), and 
the ('\ idPIH'P indicated that the neighbor might well have 
heen mistaken a:-:; to the description of the person who 
r<:>pla<'Pd tlw S('l'ePn ( T 4fi7-8). 
It was shown at trial that appellant had purchased 
an airplane ticket to Germany (T 273), and that he had 
used a eredit card belonging to the decedent to obtain 
m01wy with which to purchase the ticket ('r 279). Appel-
lant admitted having used the credit card unlawfully 
('l' and testified that lw found it in the pocket 
of a shirt which lw had loaned decedent and which de-
c:l·dent had retnrm•d ('r 61G). There was also testimony 
tliat appellant had discardt>d CPrtain items of the de-
f'l'dPnt's personal property at a motel where he stayed 
on .]uh· -1: (T :!+fi, 250), lmt a])lwllant denied this (T 543). 
Ap1w!La11t lPft Salt Lake City for Germany at 10 :30 
p.m. on July 5 (T 308), and was arrested by the military 
authorities in Hauau, Germany, at 11 :30 a.m. on July 8, 
for being absent \vithout leave (T 336). At the request 
of the American military authorities, the German Police 
n·coyered app0llant's two suitcast>s and turned them over 
to the military approximately one hour after appellant's 
UJ'l'('st ('l1 3:3). The suitcases and other items taken from 
app<'ll:rnt were then mailed to the United States Army 
Crirni11al Tnwstip:ator at Fort Douglas, Utah (T 353), 
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and were opened by a Salt Lake City Police Officer 
\ T 357). Certain items of evidence taken from tlw suit-
cases, as well as the suitcases themselves, were admitted 
in evidence at avpellant's trial over the objection of de-
fense counsel ( T 341). 
At the close of the evidence, thl' trial court withdrew 
from the jury's consideration the charge of murder in 
the first degree (T G90). In its instructions to the jury 
the court charged that appellant conlcl liP found guilty 
of murder in the second degrPe if tliv jm:' believed that 
the killing of the decedent was co11rn1itt1•cl hy the appel-
lant during the perpetration of an act of sodomy hy 
appellant with the decedent (T G97, R 40). Timely execp-
tion was taken to this instruction (T 776-777). The jury 
returned a wrdict of guilty of mnrdPr in the second 
degree (R 29). Appellant's motion for a new trial (T 
778, 785) was denied ( T 795). 
POINT I 
THE FELONY MURDER INSTRUCTION RELAT-
ING TO SODOMY WAS ERROR BECAUSE ONLY 
FELONIES WHICH ARE IN THEJ\ISELVES IN-
HERENTLY DANGEROUS TO HUMAN LIFE CAN 
SUPPORT THE APPLICATION OF THE FELO:NY 
MURDER RULE. 
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Under Utah Code Ann., (1953): 
"D<'grces of murder. - murder perpe-
trat<'d hy poison, lying in wait or any other kind 
ot' wilful, malicious and premeditated 
killing; or committed in the perpertation of, or 
attem1lt to per:iwtrate, any arson, rape, burglary 
or rolJbery; or perpetrated from a premeditated 
design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the 
death of any human being other than the one who 
is killed; or perpetrated by any act greatly dan-
gerous to the lives of others and evidencing a 
depraved mind, regardless of human life; - is 
mmder in the first degree. Any other homicide 
committed under such circmnstanccs as would 
have constituted murder at common law is murder 
in the second deqree." (emphasis added) 
In the case at har, it was the State's theory that if 
a lion1ic·idP was committed by ap1wllant during the com-
mission of sodomy, tlw homicide -would constitute murder 
in tlll' st•c011d degree, sinc0 at common law a homicide 
('OlllrnittPd during the perpetration of any felony was 
mt1rder. 'l'his theory was embodied in instruction no. 12. 
lt is submitted that the trial court committed reversible 
error in so instructing the jury, since only felonies which 
are in themselves inherently dangerous to human life 
v.-ill support application of the felony murder rule. 
'!'his Conrt has not previously spoken on the point 
now in issnP, and it becomes necessary to examine the 
c]p\ Plopment of case law in other jurisdictions. In Cali-
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fornia, where the second degree felony murder rule is in 
force, the rule has been strictly limited to cases involving 
a felony which is inherently dangerous to human lifr. 
In People v. PhillirJs, G4 Cal. 2d fi7 4, 51 Cal. Rptr. 22:J, 
414 P. 2d 353 (1966), noted in 55 Cal. L. Rev. 329 (19G7L 
the California SuprPme Court held that a homicide n·-
sulting from the ddendant's false represPntations that 
he could cure cancer -without surgery conld not he a 
second degree felony rnnrdE·r lwC'ans<· tli0 und<•rlying 
felony must bt> one which is in itself in]H·n·ntly dangerous 
to hmnan life in order to justify ap1ilicatio11 of the felon:· 
murder rule. Since the undPrlyinp; frlon:-·, ciz., fo.n'<'n:· 
by false pretenses, was not "inlH•n nti>· <lang0rons to 
lnunan life," the court in Phillips conclnd(•d that a felon: 
murder instruction was error. 
Similarly, in People 1:. Lovato, G5 Cal. Rptr. 638 (5th 
Dist. Ct. App. 1968), it was held that the possession of 
a concealable weapon by an alien is not a felony "inher-
ently dangerous to human life," so as to make a houi.icidP 
committed by the alien a second d0gr0e felony murder. 
It is thus clear that the Phillips limitation of sPcond 
degree felony murder to feloniPs which are inlwn•ntly 
dangerous to human life is firmly establishPd in Cali-
fornia law. See also People ·r. /rrln11d, 75 Cal. Hptr. l SS, 
450 P. 2d 580 (1969) (in hank) modified 011 de11iul of 
re hen ring; People v. ClinP, 7:5 Cal. Rptr. 459 (4th Dist. 
Ct. App. 1969) (holding that furnishing of plienolbarhital 
is "inherently dangerous" felony); Peo1Jle 11 • TVWiums, 63 
Cal. 2d 452, 47 Cal. Rptr. 7, 40(i P. 2<1 G.±7 (19G5) (con-
9 
spiracy to possess methcdrine not "inherently danger-
ous"); P<'oplc v. Ford, 36 Cal. Rptr. 620, 388 P. 2d 892 
(lDG-1) (in hank) rehearing denied. 
Jn Prople v. Williams, supra, the court noted that 
t lie pnrpose of th<-' fp]on>- murder rnle was to deter felons 
from killing rn·gligPntly or accidentally during the com-
mission of crimes. rp}w court then stated: 
"'L'l1is }Jllrpose may he well served ·with re-
s1wd to felonies :;;nch as rohhery or burglary, 
lmt it l1as little rt'levanc(• to a frlony which is not 
inltPl'(•ntJ:,· dang-erons. If tl1P frlmi>- is not inher-
Pll t ly clang<'rou:-; it is 11ig-hl>· imprnhahle that the 
11ot<·11tial J'don will h<-' dPt<'l'l'Pd; hP will not an-
t i('i pat<· tliat an» injur:' or dPath might ari:-;P 
:-;ol<·h- fr0111 tlie fad that l1P will commit tlw f Pl-
on>." 1;:i ('al. :2d at .J:i'"i7. -!'i Cal. Hptr. at 10, -J.Ofi 
P. :2d at lii"JO. 
A recPnl Delaware case has aeeeph'd 
the California rnle. In Jcukius 1;. Stall', 230 A. 2d :2fi:2 
(D<'lawan' 19G7), the defendant had been convicted of 
i'C'lony i1111nl<'r wlH'rP the undPrlying felony was bur-
glary. 1 n n·vPrsing tlw com·iction, the Dt>lawarP Court 
<·xarni1wcl th<' common law felony murder doctrine, noting 
that in England, ewn before its completr abolishment in 
1 th" dortrinP had at an early date bt>en limitPd to 
kHown to lw clangerons to life." Regina 1'. Ser-ne, lG 
l'o>; Cr. Cas. 311 (18S7). Noting that the California 
10 
Court has recently developed a similar limitation upon 
this application of the felony murder doctrine, the court 
in Jenkins states: 
"In our judgment, the California is sup-
ported by logic, reason, history and common sense. 
The only rational function of the felony murder 
rule is to fumish an added dderrent to the per-
petration of felonies which by their nature or by 
the attendant circumstances crPate a foreseeable 
risk of death. This function is not sPrved by appli-
cation of this rule to felonies not forseeably dan-
gerous. The rule should not b(• Pxtended beyond 
its rational function. MorPowr, application of 
the rule to felonies not fol'('Sl'(•ahly dangerous 
would be unsound analytically because there is no 
logical basis for imputing malicl? from the intent 
to commit a felony not dangerous to human life .... 
"(T)he felony second degreP murder rule of 
this State should he limitPd to homicides proxi-
mately camwd by the perpetration or attempted 
perpetration of folonies which are by nature or 
circnmstancPs forseeahly danw•rous to human lifr 
whetlwr Ruch feloni(•s hc- (•ommon la\\- or statu-
tory." 230 A. 2d at 2G9. 
The California limitation of the felony murder rule 
to felonies inherently dangerous to human life has also 
been adopted by the Kansas Supreme Court. In State v. 
Moffitt, 199 Kan. 514, 431 P. 2d 879 (1967), rehraring 
denied, the court held that in order to support the appli-
cation of the felony murder the attendant felony 
must be one which is inherently dangerous to human life. 
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It is therdore ammrent that the application of the 
<·0111111011 law f('lony mnrder doctrine in cases involving 
felonit•s ,,·Jiich do not in themselves pose a danger to 
lnnnan lifr eannot he justified in light of the experience 
of modPrn criminal jurisprudence. The rule itself has 
hei·n tlH· :-mliject of S<'n>re criticism, and it is oft-repeated 
that the doctrine Rhould not be extended beyond any ra-
tional fonction it is designed to serve. People v. TV ash-
111qto11, G:2 Cal. 2d 777, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 446, 402 P. 2d 
L:lO (l!:IGG); Notf, 55 Cal. L. Rev. 329 (1967). It is sub-
rnitteu that tl1e applil'.ation of the felony murder doctrine 
in the case at bar amounted to an unwarranted extension 
of the doctrine, and constituted prejudicial error. Ewn 
if it he as:m1111•d that the homicide lwre occurred dming 
the peqwtration of an act of sodomy, the homicide, hy 
that fact alone, sLould not be deemed a second degree 
111 u nlPr, :-iini'e is not inherently dangerous to 
lmman lifr. Indeed, fop application of tlw felony murder 
rnle in the instant case eannot he jrn.;tified on an>· ground. 
ff the f Plony mnrder doctrine wen• to he held applicable 
to any n•gardlPss of its nature, tlw result would 
lw lndi('l'Olls indeed. For example, a homicide which 
oecnrrPd dnring the conunission of a forgery would of 
Jt<•eessity IH' di•enwd a second degree murder irrespective 
of the n:-;nal elements of malice and intent to kill if such 
a position wen' adoptHl, and even though forgery itself 
is in no way inherently dangProus. Similarly, numerous 
otlwr feloni(·:,;, non<• of which pose any danger whatso-
P\ ('l' to lmrnan lift., would support application of the rule. 
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It is clear that to apply the rnle in these cases would 
serve absolutely no purpose, and ·would run countPr to 
whatevE>r logic tlw doctrine might still <'TI.JOY. 
Finally, it is significant that tltP crime of sodomy, 
although constituting a felony at the time of the homicide 
involved in the instant case, has been the suhjeet 
of reconsideration by the Utah Legislature. Under 
53-22, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as arnernkd by 
1969, Ch. 244, any sodomy whi<'h rnig-ht have been 
involved in the case at bar would 110,v eon"titute at most 
a misdemeanor and would not support application of 
the felony murder doctrine rc•gardlv'-'s wlwtlwr the ''in-
herently dangerous to human lifo" limitation were to bl· 
adopted by this Court. Implicit in om legislature's re-
duction of consl'm:nal sodomy from a fp]ony to a misdt>-
meanor is the recognitinn that sodomy lwhn•Pn consenting-
adnlts is not so serious an ofi'en:-;c• as was once ht->lievt>d. 
Indeed, it is snhmitt<>d that tlw off PnsP of :-;odorny, w!H'll 
it involves consPnting adn\t:-;, i:-; in no way a thrcat to 
lnunan life or health. 
Because of this recent- re-evalution of the severity 
of the crime of sodomy, and heC'arn..:c of thP fundm1wntall:· 
sound principles involwd in the limitation of the frlony 
murder doctrine to felonies inherently dangerous to lift>, 
this Court is urged to adopt that limitation and therPby 




THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MAT-
TER OF LAW TO CONVICT APPELLANT. 
Tlw eYi<h·nce adducPd to connect appellant with the 
l10mi<'idP was entirely circumstantial, as was admitted 
l>y the District Attorney in his closing argument (T 712). 
Ii is snlnnift<·d that this evidence was insufficient as a 
matter of law to support appellant's conviction. In this 
n·spect, it is dear that a stricter test will be applied by 
n_.vit>wing C'ourts wlwre the evidence is entirly circum-
stautial. A case decided during the tt>rritorial days of 
this Ntate illustrate this point. In PeozJ!e 11• Scott, 10 
[tah :217, ;37 P. 335 (1894), tlw d<>fendant was grantPd 
a nP\\' trial for failure of the trial court to instruct the 
jury regarding th<· d<·gret> of proof rPcp1ired where the 
l'\·id<'l1CP <•ntirl'ly circumstantial in naturt>. 'l'he court 
tlwn sta t!:'d that in snd1 cas<>s, tlw circumstances pron'n 
must 
" ... incompatible, npon any reasonable liypothesi:,;, 
\\·ith the innocl•nce of tht> accused and incapablt• 
of <'Xplanation upon any reasonable hypothesis 
otl1<'1' than the defendant's guilt. The chain of 
c:ircmnstnnec·s rnnst be complet<' and unbroken." 
10 l'talt at :2:2:2, 37 P. at 336. 
'!'lie rnl<• announced in the Scott case was followed in the 
case of State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P. 2d 285 (1941), 
1ehcuri11q dr11ird, in ·which a conviction for conspiracy to 
14 
violate anti-vice la\vs was attaekf•d upon the ground, 
inter a.Zia, that the evidence, entirely circmnstantial, was 
insufficient to support the conviction. In affirming the 
conviction, the court explained the standard relating to 
circumstantial proof. 
"(vV)here the proof of a necessary fact is de-
pendent solely upon circumstantial evidence, such 
circumstances must be sn<'h as to reasonably ex-
clude every reasonable hypotlwsis other than the 
existence of said fact and lw consistent with itR 
existence and inconsistent with its non<:>xisten<'e.'' 
101 Utah at 400, 120 P. 2d at :m:2. 
The Utah Court reaffin1wd tltP 1"i'cott formulation 
m State v. Crairforrl 59 Utah i39, 201 P. 1030 (1921). 
Reversing a conviction for third degn•e hurglary, the 
Court held that defrndant's attempt to escape while in 
custody for a rohlwry was not such a circumstance as 
would permit the inference of the defendant's guilt of a 
burglar>'· The court statt>d that wlwr<> only circumstan-
tial evidence of guilt exists, in ordPr for a circmnstance 
even to be probative: 
"the circumstancP rnnst lw sm·h as to exclude 
every reasonable hypothesis except that of tlw 
defendant's guilt ... "59 1Ttah at 45, 201 P. at 10:33. 
In State v. Burch, 100 Utah 414, 115 P. 2d 911 (1941), 
defendant had been convicted of branding a calf helong-
ing to another person with intent to steal the calf. This 
15 
Court, reviewing the evidence, noted that there was "not 
one ultimate fact necessary for conviction that is sub-
stantiated by direct evidence," and that all the evidence 
had been wholly circumstantial. In reversing the convic-
tion for insnfficiency of the evidence the Court said: 
.. r 1' circmnstantial evidence is submitted to 
a jury ... that evidence must exclude every rea-
sonable hypothesis of innocence .... But if the 
is such that reasonable men would not 
di.ff er upon the fact that it includes such an hypo-
thesis, tJwn it is not a question for the jury, but 
is one for tlH' court." 100 Utah at 417, 115 P. 2d 
at 912. 
It is thus apparent that the strict rule regarding 
tlw sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to suport a 
convirtion as announced in the Scott case, S'Upra, 
has bePn n•peatedly reaffirmed by this Court. See also 
State v. Garcia, 11 utah 2d 67, 355 P. 2d 57 (1960), 
cert. denied, 366 U.S. 970; State i:. Anderson, 108 Utah 
130, 158 P. 2d 127 (1945); State v. Laub, 102 Utah 402, 
131 P. 2d 805 (1942). 
The stricter requirement as to circumstantial evi-
dence has been variously expressed by the courts in other 
jurisdictions. example, the California Court has 
stated: 
"(vV )here circumstantial evidence is relied 
upon as proof of guilt to justify a conviction, the 
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facts and circumstances must not only be entirely 
consistent with the theory of guilt but must be 
inconsistent with any other rational conclusion." 
People v. Watson, 4fi Cal. 2d 818, 299 P.2d 243, 
250 (1956) (in bank) rehearing denied. 
Similarly, the court in State v. Gunderson, 444 P. 2d 
156 (Wash. 1968), held that if two postulates, guilt and 
innocence, can be drawn from evidence which is entirely 
circumstantial, the innocence postulate must be accepted. 
So too, the Kansas Court in State v. Tulley, 196 Kan. 56, 
410 P. 2d 267 (1966) stated that wlwre there is only 
circumstantial evidence, the facts must he inconsistent 
with any reasonable theory of the dPf Pndant's innocence. 
See also Jackson v. State, 403 P. 2d 518 (Okla. 1965): 
State v. Johnson, 57 N.l\L 716, 263 P. 2d 283 (1953); State 
v. D·en·nis, 177 Ore. 73, 159 P. 2d 838 (1945) rehearing de-
nied. 
From these cases, it is manifest that the evidence 
in the case at bar was Pntir('ly insufficient to support 
a conviction. No direct proof was adduced to show any 
connection of appellant whatsoever to the homicide. In 
fact, there is not a shred of evidence to place appellant 
at the scene at anytime near the time of death. Tested 
in light of the rule of the Scott case that the evidence, if 
wholly circumstantial, must be incapable of explanation 
on any rational hypothesis other than the guilt of the 
accused, the evidence in the case at bar falls far short 
of the standard required. For this reason, the conviction 




THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE APPEL-
LANT'S SUITCASES AND THE ITEMS CON-
TAINED THEREIN BY THE GERMAN POLICE, 
THE U.S. ARMY, AND THE SALT LAKE CITY 
POLICE WERE UNREASONABLE UNDER THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION. 
The law is well settled that a search made by official 
authorities ·will be: reasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment only undPr one of the following three circumstance:s: 
( l) Pursuant to a search warrant. Aguilar i:. 
TP:ras, 378 P.S. 108, 12 L. Ed. 2<l 723 (1964) 
(:Z) Incident to a lawful arrest. [(er v. Californilt, 
374 F.S. 23, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726 (1963). 
( 3) 'Vi th tlw consPnt of the owner of the place or 
itPm Stonrr v. California., 376 U.S. 483, 
11 L. ld. 2d 85G (1964). 
d ln tlw ease at bar, the search made by officer "Wesley 
was admittedly made without a search warrant and with-
n out the consent of appellant. no warrant or official 
order was issued, even in Germany, by the United States 
-t military authorities which directed the seizure of the 
n evidence in question. Accordingly, the search of appel-
lant's suitcases and the use of items taken therefrom 
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in evidence against appellant at trial wen• justified only 
if made incident to a lawful arrest. Clearly, however, 
such was not the case. In a recent decision, Chime! t. 
California, ________ U.S. ________ , 5 Cr. L. Rptr. 3131 (19G9), 
the United States Supreme Court t>xaminPd the purposp 
of the rule permitting a search incident to a lawful arrest, 
and noted that the rnle "'as one of neeessity to pn•vrnt: 
(a) The destruction of Pvidt>m'P the person 
arrestl-'d; and 
(h) the dang-<-'r to poliee offie<•r inherent in a 
situation wlwre the p<>rf'on n1T<>stPd might ht> 
an1wd, and then•fore pot<·ntially a threat to the 
saf<>ty of thP offiel'L 
Since these two functions may lw eomph•tely satisfied 
by a search limited to the aiTPsted iwrson's hody and the 
area within his immediate control, the court in Chime/ 
declared that searches incidPnt to a lawful aiTest an 
valid only if they do not ext<•nd lwyond that an'a. 5 Cr. 
L. Rptr. at 3136. However, in the instant casP, appellant 
had no access whatever to his snitcmws suhseqnt>nt to 
arrest in Gennany, and therefore eould not han-' <h•-
stroyed any evidence they might contain. Morpover, it 
is recognized that a search is "incident" to an arref't 
only if it is reasonably contemporanc>ous therewith. Pres-
ton v. U.S., 376 U.S. 364 (19G-!). Here, the seizure by 
German authorities took one lumr after avpellant's 
arrest, and the search by the t-;alt f_.akt> City authorities 
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occurred severed days thereafter. rrhus, both the seizure 
and search of the suitcases were in no way sufficiently 
dose in tiwe to appellant's arrest to be deemed "incident" 
therdo, and thPrefore cannot be justified on that ground. 
rl1lii1', coupled with the fact that the suitcases were far 
appl'llant's access and control at the time of the 
seizure and search, required that the authorities obtain 
eithr>r a search warrant or appellant's consent before 
vroceeding with the search. The record is clear that they 
did neitlwr. As a result, the seizure of the suitcases by 
German lJolice at the request of United States Army 
authorities, and the search by Salt Lake City Police Offi-
cials was not a reasonable search under the United States 
Constitution, and the admission in evidence of items ob-
tained i11 the i-Warch was reversible error. This is espe-
so in the instant case where the evidence connecting 
a ppvl lant to tlw homicide was meager both in quantity 
arnl probative forct>. It is submitted that to permit tlw 
us(, hv tlw 8tate of these items consequently amounted 
to gravely prejudicial error, and requires that this Court 
rt>vers<' the conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
It is dear that appellant's conviction rests upon an 
unwarranted extension of a rule of law which itself 
Las little or no logical foundation, and which should be 
limited to felonies inherently dangerous to hmnan life. 
Moreover, the evidence, entirely circumstantial in nature, 
was insuffirit>nt in law to warrant the conviction. Finally, 
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part of that evidence was obtained m violation of the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
'l'hese reasons, individually and collectiYely, compel this 
Court to reverse the conviction, and, in its discretion
1 
grant appellant a new trial. 
Hespecfnlly 8ubmitted, 
JAY D. EDMONDS 
Attorney for Appellant 
